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In Part I of this post, we sought to identify the core rules of international
environmental law that needed evolution and clarification for a claim relating to
climate change to succeed. We now turn to how international adjudication might help
to achieve genuine legal change. The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change has been at the centre of the UN’s various initiatives on the
issue, and at the time of its conclusion the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate
Change was heralded as an innovation by some. Yet, with the responses to the
Paris Agreement’s strategy of nationally determined contributions remaining far short
of what is necessary, the focus shifts more and more to strategic litigation.
At the domestic level, cases in Australia, New Zealand, India, and elsewhere
have drawn on international norms and standards to achieve domestic legal
change, with the most influential example to date being the Urgenda litigation in the
Netherlands, hailed as a landmark for future climate change litigation, and discussed
by Spijkers in his contribution to this symposium. But attention is growing also on the
international level and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a possible venue
for strategic adjudication on the climate. Vanuatu is reportedly seeking to build a
coalition in favour of an ICJ Advisory Opinion on States’ obligations, following an
inspirational campaign by Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change, a youth
NGO with members across the Pacific region.
The idea of the ICJ as venue for strategic litigation—litigation aimed at establishing
a point of law for the purpose of developing a legal regime—remains rooted in the
faith that international law can make a positive difference. And it may have a great
deal of potential in the field of climate change; but it is hardly without risks. Such an
undertaking must be approached with caution; and as any challenges wend their
way to The Hague, international lawyers have an urgent role to play in identifying
and working to clarify the open questions and possible “danger points” in any
future climate litigation, whether in the advisory capacity sought by Vanuatu, or in a
contentious, State-State litigation. Strategic litigation, as we have seen in the human
rights context, is necessarily a delicate balance between the potential for meaningful
legal advances and the danger of holding back legal development through the
rendering of an adverse opinion that authoritatively settles a legal question to the
detriment of environmental considerations.
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To date, the focus has largely been on the Hague Court’s advisory function, but it is
the contentious route which we wish to explore here: can the contentious jurisdiction
also provide an avenue for strategic climate litigation? It is true that contentious
jurisdiction has a number of disadvantages compared to the advisory function for
strategic adjudication. Foremost, any State(s) seeking to bring a contentious case
would need to establish jurisdiction. Given the deliberate absence of jurisdictional
clauses in the majority of international environmental instruments, it is likely that it
would only be possible to do so as between two States which have accepted the
Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory under Article 36(2) of the Statute (the ‘Optional
Clause’). Except when it comes to environmental law obligations that are of an erga
omnes (partes) character—which may perhaps include damage to the atmosphere
and other global common spaces—any applicant State(s) would also be required to
demonstrate a direct legal interest.
Other obstacles that might surface in a contentious case include a possible
invocation either of the clean hands principle (as virtually all States are net carbon
emitters) and the so-called Monetary Gold rule. It is devilishly difficult to identify
how the specific contribution of one State towards climate change can be untangled
from that of other States: see, for instance, the Marshall Islands cases, where
respondent States argued that the Court would only be able to determine a breach
of the common obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament in the presence of all
States bound by that obligation. Moreover, it may well be that an Advisory Opinion
would be regarded as more authoritative by the international community as a
whole, addressed as it would be to the issue of climate change in toto and not to
the application of those principles to a dispute between two States. The advisory
procedure also benefits from the opinion being addressed as legal guidance to the
requesting organ, which can thus set a broad ambit for the process, and from the
fact that any interested State may participate in the written and oral proceedings.
For all this, a contentious case would also have specific advantages, not least of
which being the issuance of a judgment that is binding on the respondent State
and makes clear determinations as to the legality—or otherwise—of its conduct,
contributing to the clarification of climate change obligations. The contentious
jurisdiction also gives access to the provisional measure procedure which, given
the scientific urgency of climate change prevention, may be necessary. Above all,
a contentious proceeding would require that the Court engages with questions
of responsibility, attribution, causation and remedies, any or all of which could be
absent from an advisory proceeding. These specific sub-questions in relation to
climate change are of particular salience, given that in this context the impetus for
strategic adjudication arises from the perceived failure of States to comply with their
international obligations.
Seeking remedies before the ICJ
Any applicant State pursuing climate justice through a contentious case before
the ICJ would presumably be interested in obtaining reparation or another form
of remedy. It is one of the key differences between the contentious and advisory
jurisdictions that a binding judgment is available in the former, resulting from a
determination of responsibility of the respondent State. Here, too, however, the
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shared nature of responsibility for climate change significantly complicates the
question of what remedies are or should be available. An obligation of cessation
attaching to net positive emissions may be impossible for a State to achieve in
the immediate term, and in the absence of action from other contributors to the
harm, especially the major historical emitters, could be argued to be unreasonable.
By contrast, an obligation of cessation attaching to emissions of GHG over and
above a certain future share of global emissions, though more achievable and
reasonable, runs the risk either of being unduly deferential to a State’s own
assessment of its position and prospects (and thus of recreating the weaknesses
of the Paris Agreement), or of being subjected to the critique that in setting definite
standards, the ICJ is straying into judicial legislation and overriding the treaty-making
competence of States. It may well be that an advisory procedure (with its potential
broad participation and discursive authority) is the more promising forum to advise
on the content of that cessation obligation.
Beyond cessation, however, a contentious case could have a valuable role to play
in clarifying obligations of reparation, particularly as the issue of compensation has
been deliberately avoided by States in climate negotiations and before the ILC.
Since under the international law of responsibility, States are obliged to make full
reparation for the injury caused by their internationally wrongful act, here too the
complex issue of causation rears its head. How should the Court take account of
the fact that injury is likely caused by the failure of not one but many States to fulfil
their climate change obligations? And yet, some form of compensation or reparation
must surely be part of the long-term solution to climate change, given the demands
of justice involved.
Ultimately a choice between the jurisdictions need not be made. These are—
and must be—parallel, and not competitor strategies. Both have strengths and
weaknesses, and they have the potential to be mutually reinforcing. In consort, then,
with the Vanuatuan effort to secure an advisory opinion, we believe it apposite to
consider the legal gaps that could be filled by a judgment in a contentious dispute on
a State’s responsibility for climate change, and so where work should be focussed by
academics wishing to support that goal.
The way forward
With less than ten years until the IPCC’s estimated deadline of 2030 for emissions
to peak and decline rapidly, and with the scientific consensus on the human origins
of climate change virtually uniform, there can no longer be any reasonable doubt
that climate change is an urgent issue of justice and human rights, both within and
between States. Yet reasonable (and far from worst-case) estimates based on the
current policies of States suggest that the world is on course for between 2.3° and
3.2°C of warming by 2100.
These major and foreseeable harms of a warming world—sea level rise and land
inundation; increases in severe storms; the harmful effects of heat; crop failures,
drought and famine; and the ensuing forced migrations—will disproportionately
affect the Global South: States that have contributed little to the causes of the
crisis. Though developed States, too, will not escape unscathed, these dangers
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threaten developing States to an even higher degree, and the threat is compounded
because these States are less able to finance the adaptation and recovery measures
that will be necessary. Moreover, without collective solidarity structures, such
foreseeable harms will disproportionately affect the poorest and most vulnerable
members of our societies within States, developed or otherwise. Without wealth
and technology transfers in volumes never seen before, or intensive investment by
developed States into mechanisms to reverse the effects of carbon emissions, the
demands of decarbonisation will be just another example of the developed States
kicking away the ladder, as economist Ha-Joon Chang puts it. It is no surprise that
2019’s UNFCCC COP25 drew sharp condemnation from environmentalists and
campaigners, as States failed yet again to reach agreement on vital questions,
including elements of the Paris Rulebook needed to bring that agreement into
full effect. These are questions which must be faced now. Just weeks ago, and
almost unnoticed in the deluge of COVID-19 news, Tropical Cyclone Harold cut a
swath of destruction through Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga. One of the strongest storms
ever recorded in the region, Harold is a terrible reminder that the harmful impacts
of climate change are not some far distant future of slowly rising waters, but are
immediate, unpredictable, and utterly devastating.
Both between and within States, it is the most vulnerable who are at most risk of
the harmful impacts of a warming world, and who are least able to cope with the
threatened impact of climate change. Climate justice demands an answer to this
urgent question: who should bear which burdens? (A question Auz has addressed
in his excellent post in this symposium). It is in this respect that international
adjudication offers a unique forum for lending clarity to State obligations, and
perhaps for driving meaningful legal advances. That States consistently fail
meaningfully to discuss issues of compensation and reparation in international
negotiations should not result in the most vulnerable shouldering the highest costs,
either in human or financial terms. Nor, as a matter of justice, is it tolerable for the
vast debts of carbon colonialism to be recast as voluntary aid given in benevolence
by the rich world which has developed at the expense of the environment and former
colonies alike. Judicial processes at the international level offer an opportunity to
recast the discussion on these questions, and to refocus on the immediate and
future harms of climate change within the historical context of developmental justice.
There is no doubt that such a conversation will be difficult, and a good outcome is far
from certain. It is, though, a task worth attempting.
We have here highlighted only a small subset of the many intriguing legal questions
which stand to be resolved by a contentious case on climate change. Academic legal
work is needed to further clarify these – and the many other – issues in preparation
for such an eventuality, offering researchers not only a highly meaningful but also
truly fascinating set of questions around which to focus our future work. The authors
are embarked on a project—in collaboration with the Global Legal Action Network—
which will contribute to that task, with the aim to prepare a model memorial for future
ICJ climate cases.
Making a success of strategic climate litigation at the international level is, though,
a labour which will demand many hands, and the combined work of researchers,
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activists and practitioners across the international environmental law field will be
needed to prepare the groundwork for a successful appeal to the Hague, whether to
the ICJ’s contentious or advisory jurisdictions. Let us begin.
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